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THE  CASE  FOR  EDUCATIONAL  FEDERALISM:
PROTECTING  EDUCATIONAL  POLICY  FROM
THE  NATIONAL  GOVERNMENT’S
DISECONOMIES  OF SCALE
Roderick M. Hills, Jr.*
There have been reform committees of fifty, of sixty, of seventy,
of one hundred and all sorts of numbers that started out to do up
the regular political Organizations.  They were mornin’ glories—
looked lovely in the mornin’ and withered up in a short time, while
the regular machines went on flourishin’ forever, like fine old
oaks. . . . The fact is that a reformer can’t last in politics.  He can
make a show for a while, but he always comes down like a rocket.
Politics is as much a regular business as the grocery or the dry-goods
or the drug business.  You’ve got to be trained up to it or you’re
sure to fail.1
INTRODUCTION
In a federal system, which level of government—federal, state, or
local—should pursue educational innovations?  And should the level
of government affect how aggressively the innovators proceed?  It
would be folly to insist on clear and rigid answers to such general
questions.  But I will press the less risky (and, therefore, less interest-
ing) position of a weak presumption: the higher the level of govern-
ment pressing the innovation, the stronger the presumption that the
innovation should be modest.  Moreover, the national government’s
intervention ought to be geared towards promoting an otherwise
voiceless constituency’s political participation, not towards promoting
a particular policy prescription.
 2012 Roderick M. Hills, Jr.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* William T. Comfort III Professor of Law, New York University Law School.
1 WILLIAM L. RIORDON, PLUNKITT OF TAMMANY HALL 17, 19 (1963).
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My argument for this modest national role is rooted in tempered
optimism about what I shall call “stably governed households” and
pessimism about the federal government’s capacity to improve house-
hold decision-making.  Both the pessimism and optimism spring from
the same source—the enormous and undiversified stakes that stably
governed households have in both their children’s education and the
value of owner-occupied residential real estate.  These stakes suggest
that there are few scale economies in K-12 education that cannot be
realized by subnational governments.  Even the most capably gov-
erned households need help from larger-scale governments, but sub-
national governments are, for the most part, equal to the task.
Moreover, the reasons for giving deference to stably governed house-
holds in their educational decisions also suggest deference for subna-
tional governments, because the latter tend to be more firmly under
the control of the former than higher levels of government.
Household autonomy, in short, implies federalism.  The national
government’s role can be limited to supplementing households’ and
subnational governments’ incentives where educational programs
have spillover benefits not captured by parents and homeowners and
where, as a result, subnational government will tend to under-supply
the good in question—for instance, military science (e.g., West Point)
or aid to the indigent (e.g., Head Start).
On the pessimistic side, I will suggest that the national govern-
ment does not have a good track record of mobilizing households that
lack stable governance to provide political support for its educational
programs.  Where the beneficiaries of federal educational programs
have been stably governed households—for instance, family farms or
children with learning disabilities— then those beneficiaries control
the program and maintain its funding.  Unlike stably governed house-
holds, however, households headed by indigent or single parents do
not have the organizational capacity to mount strong political support
for federal initiatives.  Federal reforms for the benefit of these house-
holds are, therefore, perpetually at risk of being overwhelmed by
ethnocultural divisions or cartels of educational providers—the same
forces that stymie educational equality at the subnational level, but, at
the federal level, further aided by the unwieldy bicameral and pre-
sidentialist legislative process that mires the national democracy in
perennial gridlock.
National interventions to promote educational equality, there-
fore, face a paradox of what Paul Peterson has called the mismatch
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between “functional” and “political” federalism.2  If the federal gov-
ernment focuses on its functional advantage of aiding constituencies
that subnational governments neglect, then the federal reform may
lack sufficient political support.  But, if the federal government broad-
ens its mandate to pursue generalized reforms of the K-12 curriculum,
teacher evaluation, or testing of students, then they diffuse their reve-
nue and regulatory effort in fixing that which is not broken—the sub-
national educational system catering to stably governed households.
Worse yet, such federal reforms might break what does not need to be
fixed, by eroding school districts’ reliance on local political networks
and own-source revenue, characteristics that make those districts
responsive to the demands of stably governed households.  Uniform
testing mandates or teacher evaluation standards may also provoke a
backlash from middle-class suburban households who find federal
reforms—for instance, testing mandates or curricular standards—to
be a gratuitous impediment to what they regard as well-functioning
schools.
Like Plunkitt’s reforming “mornin’ glories,” reformers are not
likely to have staying power unless they can find or create some
“machine” with the political capacity to carry on the reform after the
federal reformers have lost national power.  Federal educational
reformers, therefore, might be best advised to focus on the political
over the technocratic: they might concentrate less on pedagogical
reforms best designed to induce educational achievement and more
on fostering subnational constituencies that will sustain federal
reforms through the vicissitudes of national politics.  Rather than anx-
iously specify pedagogical programs (“portfolio schools,” KIPP, Suc-
cessful for All, etc.) to see which offers the best hopes for an upward
tick in standardized test scores, reformers might instead focus on culti-
vating a constituency of grateful low-income parents by giving them
the incentives and political skills to fight for their own educational
interests.  The ultimate goal should be to transform the beneficiaries
of federal action into a constituency with the same political clout as
the stably governed households that dominate subnational govern-
ment.  Otherwise, federal educational policy may become a recipe for
policy-making ADD—in Charles Payne’s pungent phrase: “so much
reform, so little change.”3
2 See generally PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 16–49 (1995) (dis-
cussing the costs and benefits of federalism in various policy spheres).
3 CHARLES PAYNE, SO MUCH REFORM, SO LITTLE CHANGE (2008).
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I. SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN HOUSEHOLDS’ EDUCATIONAL
SELF-GOVERNANCE
One can usefully think of households in which the households’
owners also jointly raise children residing in the households’ property
as consumer cooperatives specializing in the management of child-
rearing services and residential real estate.  Two-thirds of American
households actually own the real estate that they occupy,4 but even
the remaining third that rents their housing must manage their lease-
hold by negotiating a price, monitoring the use of utilities, dividing
up cleaning chores, making furnishing decisions, allocating living
space, and fulfilling payment responsibilities.  Likewise, while under
three percent of families with children “home-school” those children,5
a far larger percentage of households actively manage their children’s
education by making the fundamental decisions about where to live
(and, therefore, where their children will attend public school), how
to intervene in PTA or school board elections, and how to encourage
homework and studying.  Finally, households’ transfer of wealth to
their children is simply staggering, constituting, by some measures, a
majority of total social wealth.6
How well do these consumer-cooperatives perform in child rear-
ing?  (I’ll defer the question of real estate management and its rela-
tion to education for Part II.).  In general, as I explain in more detail
in Part I.A, stably governed households have such a good track record
in, and such good incentives for, effective child rearing, that govern-
mental officials would do well to treat their decisions as presumptively
serving the best interests of their children.
This presumption does not mean that households do not some-
times fail.  Even the best governed households face collective action
problems requiring help from officials at a higher level of govern-
ment, and a substantial number of households collapse from internal
disagreements, corruption, or incompetence.  For these household
problems, as I explain below in Part I.B, some sort of governmental
intervention is required.  I reserve for Part II the question of which
level of government, national or subnational, is best suited for coming
to households’ assistance.
4 FED. INTERAGENCY FORUM ON CHILD AND FAMILY STATISTICS, AMERICA’S CHIL-
DREN: KEY NATIONAL INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING, 2011, available at http://www.child-
stats.gov/americaschildren/index3.asp.
5 Id. at 197.
6 See Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Intergenerational Transfers and Saving, 2 J. ECON. PERSP.
41, 43–44 (1988).
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A. The Case for Governmental Deference to Stably Governed Households
By “stably governed households,” I mean a special subset of all
households in which two adults jointly own and manage their com-
mon living space and also jointly act as guardians for children residing
on the premises.7  These specially defined households are stably gov-
erned in that (a) the co-owners of the household own the real estate
and other resources needed for the children as an undivided com-
mons, (b) either law or strong social norms or both discourage unilat-
eral decision-making by either of the pair of owners regarding the
household or children, and (c) exit is discouraged through social
norms as well as the division of pooled assets regardless of initial
contribution.8
On this admittedly sketchy definition, the substantial majority of
children in the United States continue to be raised within stably gov-
erned households.  Two-thirds of all children are raised by two mar-
ried parents.9 To avoid misunderstanding, I emphasize that marriage
of the households’ co-owners is neither necessary nor sufficient for
that household to be stably governed: in theory, any two persons who
have pooled resources and impeded their capacity to exit from the
common child-rearing enterprise can qualify as stably governed by my
definition.  In practice, creating such households through contract is
rare and, in any case, there are no statistics on such contractually
bound stakeholders’ track record.  Therefore, the track record of mar-
ried couples has to serve as a crude proxy by which to measure the
prevalence and performance of stably governed households.
Although family law varies from state to state, all such rules involve
7 As Robert Ellickson has noted, it is important to distinguish between “house-
holds” and “families.”  “Households” are systems of collective internal governance reg-
ulating relations among common occupants of residential real estate, while “families”
are collectivities of persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption that may or may
not cohabitate in the same residential structure.  In my lexicon, “stably governed
households” are a subset of all households—those households controlled by a pair of
individual owners in which both owners also enjoy the rights and duties of guardians
of the minor children residing in the household. See Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking
the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 229–31
(2006).
8 The definition of a stably governed household offered here is akin to the defi-
nition of a “liberal commons” as defined by Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The
Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 581–98 (2001).
9 Although the number of U.S. children living with a single parent increased
from twenty-three percent in 1960 to thirty-four percent in 2010, two-thirds of all
children are still raised by married couples who constitute a subset (albeit a large
majority) of what I term stably governed households. AMERICA’S CHILDREN, supra note
4.
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substantial pooling of resources of spouses, equal division of pooled
resources on dissolution, and norms discouraging dissolution (one of
which, indeed, is the equal division itself).  To the extent that such
rules give each of the two childcare providers an equal share of post-
dissolution common pool, the rules discourage individualistic shirking
and aggrandizement of common-pool resources, effects that tend to
redirect those resources towards expenditures beneficial to chil-
dren.10  To the extent that parties to a marriage bargain less in the
shadow of post-dissolution outcomes and more in light of the social
norms for dividing household labor, the post-dissolution rules matter
less and social norms, more.11  Measured according to norms rather
than law, the social norms of marriage in the United States, although
far from ideal, are relatively egalitarian when compared to those of
other societies.12 Again, this egalitarianism encourages resource pool-
ing and discourages both dissolution and pre-dissolution shirking on
contributions to the common household enterprise.
The continued prevalence of such households in child-rearing is
good news for their constituent children: it is one of the most consis-
tent findings of research on child welfare that children in such stably
governed households are better off than children raised by plausible
10 On the effects of post-dissolution rules for dividing resources on parties’ share
of marital resources during the marriage, see generally Robert A. Pollak, A Transac-
tion Cost Approach to Families and Households, 23 J. ECON. LIT. 581 (1985) (applying the
transactional cost approach to the family changes the structure and relationships
regarding marital resources).  On the idea that improving the post-dissolution posi-
tion of each party and thereby balancing the bargaining position of each party within
the household can improve the position of the children by reducing the incentive of
either party to aggrandize resources for personal benefit, see generally Shoshana
Grossbard, Repack the Household: A Response to Robert E. Ellickson’s, Unpacking the
Household, 116 YALE L. J. POCKET PART 341 (2007) (addressing the need to include
household labor in economic analyses); Marjorie B. McElroy & Mary Jean Horney,
Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand, 22
INT’L ECON. REV. 333 (1981) (using demand theory to characterize family
economics).
11 See generally Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, Separate Spheres Bargaining and
the Marriage Market, 101 J. POL. ECON. 988 (1993) (explaining how bargaining equilib-
ria change between single and two-parent households); Robert A. Pollak, Bargaining
Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 414, 415 (2007) (arguing that in single-
parent households, laws matter more than Ellickson thinks).
12 On the GLOBE survey of sixty-two societies’ gender egalitarianism, the United
States scored 5.06 (social values), ranking seventh out of sixty-two societies. See ROB-
ERT J. HOUSE ET AL., CULTURE, LEADERSHIP, AND ORGANIZATIONS 365–66 (2004).  The
United States does not fare so well on an assessment of gender equality when com-
pared to other industrialized democracies, ranking only seventeenth out of fifty-eight
nations, albeit eighth in educational attainment. See AUGUSTO LOPEZ-CLAROS &
SAADIA ZAHIDI, WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT 8 (2004).
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rival institutions (e.g., single parents, orphanages, foster families,
etc.), regardless of whether welfare is measured by current poverty,13
mortality and health,14 or rates of child abuse and neglect.15
Although it is possible that these findings are a “selection effect”
caused by a hidden variable correlated with but different from mar-
riage itself, multiple efforts to uncover that hidden non-marital varia-
ble have proven fruitless: even “shotgun” marriages, for instance,
seem radically to reduce poverty.16
Why do stably governed households so consistently outperform
rival institutions?  If one believes, as does Jim Dwyer, that child care
expertise is important for child-rearing success,17 then the apparent
superiority of stably governed households over its rivals is a mystery.
The adults in charge of a stably governed household, after all, are not
required to be licensed or otherwise screened before they assume
child-rearing duties.18  Moreover, precisely because they are stable,
there are few occasions (such as divorce hearings or 911 calls) for ex
post interventions by court-appointed psychiatrists or other child care
professionals to which one of the parents does not consent.
Yet, contrary to the predictions of Dwyer’s expertise-based theory,
children in stably governed households do much better than either
children raised in aggregate-care facilities—orphanages, group
homes, etc.—or foster families, where professional screening, licens-
ing, and supervision is required.19  One possible answer to the mystery
13 See Robert I. Lerman, The Impact of the Changing U.S. Family Structure on Child
Poverty and Income Inequality, 63 ECONOMICA 119, 137 tbl.10 (1996); Adam Thomas &
Isabel Sawhill, For Richer or for Poorer: Marriage as an Antipoverty Strategy, 21 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 587, 597 (2002).
14 G. Weitoft et al., Mortality, Severe Morbidity, and Injury in Children Living with
Single Parents in Sweden: A Population-Based Study, 361 LANCET 289, 295 (2003).
15 ANDREA J. SEDLAK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL
INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT § 5.3 (2010).  The NIS-4 study was
based on a survey of almost 11,000 child welfare professionals in 122 counties within
the United States.
16 See ROBERT I. LERMAN, MARRIED AND UNMARRIED PARENTHOOD AND ECONOMIC
WELL-BEING 21–22 (2002).
17 See James. G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doc-
trine of Parents’ Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1371, 1447 (1994).
18 Despite occasional calls for licensing of parents, see, e.g., Hugh LaFollette,
Licensing Parents, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 182, 182 (1980) (arguing the merits of requir-
ing a parenting license), no such ex ante screening exists in the United States for
married couples who raise their own children.
19 For a sample of studies describing the relatively poor performance of institu-
tional care when compared to either foster-family care, see DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL’S CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN’S
MENTAL HEALTH (2000); Sandra J. Altshuler & John Poertner, The Child Health and
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might be that good incentives are more important for child rearing
than expertise.  Childcare providers with good incentives, after all, will
seek out the assistance of experts and defer to those who can make a
credible signal of expertise.  Experts with weak incentives to care
about their wards’ welfare, however, have little reason to bring their
expertise to bear.  Persons in charge of stably governed households
have powerful incentives to pay close attention to their children’s wel-
fare created by the basic structure of the household—in particular,
long-term cohabitation and vicarious liability.
Because they must share living quarters with the persons under
their supervision for extended periods of time—typically sixteen to
eighteen years—caregivers in stably governed households have incen-
tives to develop strong attachments to their children and train them
in important social and self-care skills.  Because they are legally liable
to support such children over the long term and can be legally liable
for their children’s misbehavior, such guardians have incentives to
train their children to avoid anti-social or criminal behavior and
embrace economic self-sufficiency.  Because there are two care provid-
ers, each with a veto on the unilateral decisions of the other, there is
some minimum separation of powers to reduce the chances of capri-
cious or self-interested decisions.20  Because there are only two execu-
tives, however, the danger of diluted responsibility from spreading
decision-making power over a larger group is mitigated: parents in a
stably governed household come close to being a “unitary executive”
with the familiar advantage of low decision-making costs.  This does
not mean that such decision-makers cannot delegate their parenting
Illness Profile—Adolescent Edition: Assessing Well-Being in Group Homes or Institutions, 81
CHILD WELFARE 495 (2002); Richard P. Barth, Institutions vs. Foster Homes: The Empirical
Base for the Second Century of Debate, JORDAN INST. FOR FAMILIES (2002); M. Colton, Car-
ers of Children: A Comparative Study of the Practices of Residential and Foster Carers, 6 CHIL-
DREN & SOC’Y 25 (1992); Deborah A. Frank et al., Infants and Young Children in
Orphanages: One View from Pediatrics and Child Psychiatry, 97 PEDIATRICS 569 (1996).
20 On the idea that separation of powers in household governance protects chil-
dren’s interests in deliberate decision-making, see Ira C. Lupu, The Separation of Powers
and the Protection of Children, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1317, 1327–28 (1994) (arguing for
some capacity for state intervention to insure that parents do not maintain an
unmonitored monopoly on the children’s access to information, medical care, and
other necessities).  I suggest only that the advantage of two parents over a single par-
ent rests on analogous logic of checks and balances.  Of course, adding an extra pair
of hands to help with conflicts between work and child care provide an equally obvi-
ous explanation for the advantages of two caretakers over a single provider. See gener-
ally Chloe E. Bird, Gender Differences in the Social and Economic Burdens of Parenting and
Psychological Distress, 59 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 809 (1997) (analyzing the division of the
burden of childcare between partners and the effects thereof).
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duties to schools, nannies, doctors, therapists, coaches, and other
childcare specialists or collectives.  So long as parents can retract these
delegations, however, they remain structurally more unified than gov-
ernance arrangements with larger numbers of decision-makers.  It
may take a village to raise a child, but it takes a far smaller number of
people to decide what kind of village (or kibbutzim) will be effective
child-rearing delegees.
All of these structural incentives insure that stably governed
households tend to keep “caseloads” small enough to insure the care-
ful monitoring of their charges: the average number of children in
stably governed households hovers around two.21  This is not to say
that the adults of a household cannot experience conflicts of interest
with even such a small and homogenous constituency (between, say,
educating their children and putting them to work to earn income for
the household).  But even such conflicts are tempered by the adults’
long-term responsibility for the welfare of their “employees.”22
By contrast, the major rivals to stably governed households have
low stakes in the outcomes of the children entrusted to their care.
Their jurisdiction tends to be fragmented and uncoordinated, based
on the provision of some narrow range of specialized services over a
tiny segment of the child’s life (e.g., education, law enforcement, psy-
chiatric counseling, etc.) to a large number of children (ranging from
classrooms with dozens, to caseloads of hundreds, of kids).  Unsurpris-
ingly, such providers can develop professional interests in employ-
ment or political patronage23 distinct from the interests of the
children with whose care they are officially charged.
The superiority of stably governed household caregivers’ incen-
tives over those of alternative providers remains regardless of whether
one assumes that parents are motivated by altruism or self-interest.
Since Gary Becker made the economics of family relations a subject
21 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Average Number of Children per Family and per
Family with Children, (2004), http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/
tabST-F1-2000.pdf.
22 For an analysis of how households in different cultures reflect their own chil-
dren’s interests and desires in the tradeoff between labor and education, see JO BOY-
DEN ET AL., WHAT WORKS FOR WORKING CHILDREN? (1998); MANFRED LIEBEL, A WILL OF
THEIR OWN (2004).  Unlike much of the literature on child labor, Boydon et al. and
Liebel, accept the possibility that children’s choices to work rather than attend school
are sometimes both sincere and rational, and attempt to gauge children’s preferences
through field surveys.
23 For illustrations of corruption and incompetence in one family court system,
see generally CAROLE BELL FORD, THE WOMEN OF COURTWATCH (2005) (detailing sex-
ism and corruption in the Harris County Family Court).
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for formal economics,24 the debate over parental motivation contin-
ues with no definite empirical resolution: likely, parental motivations
vary with parents’ characteristics (for instance, parents’ level of educa-
tion).25  Regardless of whether altruism in the child’s well-being or
self-interest in, say, old age insurance motivates household care prov-
iders, those providers have more direct interest in their child’s well-
being than alternative caregivers who lack either sort of motivation to
the same degree.  Caregivers outside of the stably governed household
have ties to children too tenuous or short-lived to generate either
incentives rooted in love or money.
How should the superiority of stable households’ incentives affect
governmental attitudes towards those households’ decisions about
their children’s education?  I have suggested elsewhere that, on purely
instrumental grounds, government would be wise to adopt a rule of
deference to household decision-making regarding children’s best
educational interests.26  As noted above, governmental officials face
extraordinary constraints of time and resources in supervising chil-
dren: unable to assess the merits of most child-rearing decisions
24 GARY S. BECKER, TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1991).  Becker assumed altruistic
parents.  Becker has since recanted on the exclusive reliance on parental altruism. See
Gary Becker, Nobel Prize Lecture (Dec. 9, 1992), at 50, http://home.uchicago.edu/
gbecker/Nobel/nobellecture.pdf (“Many economists, including myself, have exces-
sively relied on altruism to tie together the interests of family members.”).
25 See Joseph G. Altonji et al., Parental Altruism and Inter Vivos Transfers: Theory and
Evidence, 105 J. POL. ECON. 1121, 1159 (1997); Donald Cox & Mark R. Rank, Inter-Vivos
Transfers and Intergenerational Exchange, 74 REV. ECON. & STAT. 305, 313 (1992); Fumio
Hayashi, Is the Japanese Extended Family Altruistically Linked? A Test Based on Engel Curves,
103 J. POL. ECON. 661, 672 (1995); Shelly J. Lundberg et al., Do Husbands and Wives
Pool Their Resources? Evidence from the UK Child Benefit, 32 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 463, 479
(1997); see also J. Ignacio Gimenez-Nadal, Parents’ Education as Determinant of Time
Transfers to Children: An Intergenerational Transfer Approach (Univ. of Zaragosa Ctr. for
Time Use, Research Working Paper), available at http://www.eea-esem.com/files/
papers/EEA-ESEM/2011/143/Manuscript%20EEA%20Conference.pdf (“[W]e
hypothesize that, while exchange purposes may drive the decisions of low educated
individuals regarding transfers of human capital to children, altruism may drive the
decisions of highly educated individuals.”).
26 I defend this view in Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private
Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144 (2003).  The premise of my article is identical to
the position defended in JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
(2006)—namely, that parents’ entitlements to deference for their child-rearing deci-
sions must rest entirely on the benefits of such deference to the welfare of the child.  I
disagree with Dwyer insofar as Dwyer argues that such entitlements to deference can-
not be characterized as a parental “right”: the Constitution frequently protects the
“rights” of institutions (juries, home-rule cities, trade unions, political parties,
churches, and other collective entities) to govern their constituents for the sake of
those constituents’ own welfare.
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through direct observation of outcomes, such officials ought to treat
decisions of stably governed households as presumptively more likely
to serve the best interests of the child than, say, the decisions of teach-
ers or probate judges.
Federal and state law, indeed, frequently gesture towards some-
thing roughly like such a presumption.  Both federal and state consti-
tutional substantive due process doctrines require some level of
deference towards parental decision-makers.27  Likely more significant
are the myriad of decisions construing state statutes in favor of paren-
tal authority to make educational decisions on behalf of their chil-
dren.28  These judicial efforts to support parental authority, however,
tend to be narrow in scope, leaving governmental authorities with
broad latitude to intervene in familial affairs, especially when there
are signs that the household in question might not be stably
governed.29
As argued in the next section, this judicial reluctance to define a
broad area of parental autonomy in raising children makes sense,
because households are properly entitled to deference only when they
are stably governed and only when they are not impeded by collective
action problems that interfere with their children’s legitimate educa-
tional interests.  Institutions larger than the individual household are
needed to insure these conditions of household autonomy in child-
rearing.
B. Failure of Households in Educational Governance
The deference to which stably governed households are entitled
does not eliminate the need for extra-household interventions from
state officials.  Even stably governed households face collective action
27 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 75 (2000) (invalidating a state law
allowing any person to petition for visitation rights); Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510,
516–17 (Fla. 1998) (same); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 579 (Tenn. 1993) (same).
28 See, e.g., Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571 (Ct. App. 2008)
(construing state teacher certification requirements to exempt home-schooling par-
ents); Birst v. Sanstead, 493 N.W.2d 690, 696 (N.D. 1992) (ruling that home-schooling
parents need not comply with fire codes applicable to school buildings).
29 See, e.g., Dupuy v. Samuels, 465 F.3d 757, 761–62 (7th Cir. 2006) (deciding that
parents were not entitled to pre-deprivation hearing before complying with child
safety plan, because such compliance is “voluntary” despite threat from state of loss of
child custody absent compliance); In re Adoption of J.P., 2011 Ark. 535 (2011) (hold-
ing that custodial father could forbid grandparents’ visitation with father’s children
but that father’s spouse and children’s stepmother could not adopt children,
because, given familial friction, adoption would not serve the best interests of the
children). See generally JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW (2009) (discussing possible
areas in which the government may intervene in private citizens’ personal affairs).
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problems in overcoming market failures—in particular, failures in
credit and insurance markets—that require coordination with other
households.  Moreover, not all households are stable: like any other
organization, the household’s decision-making reliability can collapse
as a result of irreconcilable internal disagreements, incompetence, or
corruption.  In either the case of market-failure or internal break-
down, some system of governance that transcends the individual
household is required.  What sort of government (local, subnational,
national) is a question I defer until Part II.  For now, I will describe in
more detail below how such failures arise, grouping them into the
expositionally convenient categories of “market failures” that afflict
even well-governed households and “internal breakdowns” that bur-
den those households that lack a stable government.
1. Inter-household Coordination to Address Market Failures
Education costs money.  Even home-schooling households need
sufficient resources to support one parent’s staying at home to teach
the kids.  If the educational investment produces human capital worth
the expense, then altruistic parents would make optimal investments
in education without much pressure from state officials.  Even selfish
parents would make such investments if they could secure later re-
payment from their offspring.
The likely failure of credit and insurance markets, however,
impedes even stably governed households from raising funds suffi-
cient to cover the costs of optimal educational services.  In theory,
households could borrow the additional funds required for educa-
tional services, securing them by the extra earning capacity that such
funds provide.  In practice, lenders cannot easily obtain security inter-
ests in human capital produced by educational expenditures: foreclos-
ing on a high school diploma is a trickier proposition than foreclosing
on mortgaged real estate, because of the intangibility and mobility of
the asset and norms against indentured service.30  Assuming (implau-
sibly) that parents lack altruistic regard for their own offspring, the
parents would face a similar problem in obtaining a credible commit-
ment for repayment from their children.  The failure of insurance
markets leads to a similar problem of insufficient human capital:
30 See Dirk Krueger & Jessica Tjornhom Donohue, On the Distributional Conse-
quences of Child Labor Legislation, 46 INT’L ECON. REV. 785, 788 (2005) (“[W]e assume
that adults cannot borrow against their children’s incomes to finance their educations
. . . .”). See generally Edward Lazear, Family Background and Optimal Schooling Decisions,
62 REV. ECON. & STAT. 42 (1980) (analyzing the differences between rich and poor
and the cost of borrowing for that education).
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households facing income shocks because of an adult member’s sick-
ness, death, or unemployment cannot easily purchase unemployment
insurance to smooth the disruption in cash flow.  Putting children to
work becomes an informal form of household self-insurance.31  While
this decision is not necessarily irrational or harmful either to house-
hold or child,32 failures in the market of unemployment insurance
will lead to the over-use of children in labor and the under-accumula-
tion of human capital.
It is sometimes also argued that human capital investments have
spillover benefits on social welfare beyond the individual household
that households would, therefore, under-value.  In an intuitive way,
for instance, it is easy to see that society as a whole benefits from mass
literacy necessary for a competent democracy.  But the notion that
parents lack sufficient incentive to teach their children to read
because the children would not internalize all of the benefits of
democracy, culture, etc., that reading promotes seems implausible,
given that the private benefits of education are so large in an industri-
alized society where the price of illiteracy is destitution.33  The prob-
lem of educational spillover benefits might better be understood not
as households’ neglect of spillovers beneficial to society as a whole but
rather as selfish parents’ indifference to educational investments even
when they improve the earning power of their children, because the
parents derive no private benefit from those investments and cannot
secure any credible commitment from those children to re-pay paren-
tal effort.  Understood as a problem of selfish parents, the spillover
problem might better be analyzed as a failure of credit markets.
The obvious solution for these failures of credit or insurance mar-
kets is to use taxation or regulation to mandate and finance education
and unemployment insurance.  The question remains whether this
solution ought to be imposed subnationally or nationally, a question
to which I turn in Part II.
31 See Kaushik Basu, Child Labor: Cause, Consequence, and Cure With Remarks on
International Labor Standards, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1083, 1104 (1999); Krueger & Donohue,
supra note 31, at 787–88.
32 SANDY HOBBS & JAMES MCKECHNIE, CHILD EMPLOYMENT IN BRITAIN (1997) (not-
ing empirical evidence suggesting that five hours of child labor per week has no effect
on children’s educational attainment).  Even a trade-off between present and future
income might be in the child’s own self-interest depending on the returns of each
activity.
33 Robert Topel notes that it is exceedingly difficult to find evidence that invest-
ments in education produce spillover benefits in excess of its considerable private
benefits. See Robert Topel, The Private and Social Values of Education, in EDUCATION
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 47, 53–56 (2004), available at http://www.clevelandfed.
org/research/conferences/2004/november/cbook.pdf.
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2. The Internal Breakdown of the Stably Governed Household
Even assuming that households run by married couples meet my
definition of “stable government,” it is plain that there are lots of chil-
dren in unstable households.  Not all such households fail in their
child-rearing, but, as Jim Dwyer argues, there are a sufficient number
of such households that some mechanism beyond the household itself
by which to repair the breakdown or wind up the household’s
affairs—in the extreme case, through removal of children from the
home and assignment of child custody.
Even when households with children remain stably governed,
there still is a need for “constitutional rules” to insure a stability-induc-
ing bargaining framework in which caregivers deliberate about the
deployment of resources.  Put simply, tyrannical families do not make
for stably governed households.  Instead, tyrannically constituted
households create incentives for the tyrant to skim household
resources for personal consumption, depriving children of educa-
tional resources and inspiring the sorts of non-cooperative behavior
succinctly described by Ted Bergstrom as “harsh words and burnt
toast.”34  Necessary framework rules include not only rules for prop-
erty division upon divorce but also mediation of intra-household con-
flicts in anticipation of ongoing household relations.35  Even if one
takes the view that formal contract law has little role to play in an
ongoing marriage, there are many subsidies, services, and policies,
ranging from “automatic arrest” and “no-drop” policies for domestic
violence complaints to testing requirements for the children of home-
schooling parents, all of which require some funding or regulating
body larger than the dysfunctional household itself.  Finally, parents
need a minimum level of competence correctly to evaluate the educa-
tional offerings funded by the state: parents with very high discount
rates or very low information about the future value of human capital
are unlikely to make rational decisions about investments in such capi-
tal.  There is some evidence that home-schooling parents who allow
themselves to be assessed do a competent job of providing educa-
34 Theodore C. Bergstrom, Economics in a Family Way, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 1903, 1926
(1996).
35 Mary Anne Case, Enforcing Bargains in an Ongoing Marriage, 35 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 225, 227 (2011); see also LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT (1981)
(containing an extended defense of the idea that disputes within an ongoing mar-
riage ought to be resolved through formal contract litigation, a position traditionally
resisted by courts).
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tional services.36  But the evidence is unreliable, because it does not
correct for rampant selection bias: minimum schooling requirements,
private school certification, and testing of home-schooled students
would, therefore, seem to be part of the framework necessary to
insure that caregivers possess the minimum competence necessary to
take the lead role in supervising their children’s education.
In sum, the stably governed households’ large stakes in their chil-
dren’s educational outcomes suggest that such households’ caregivers
receive a presumption of autonomy in arranging for the education of
children.  But collective action problems and the need to insure that
the households are indeed competent and stable suggest that some
governmental officials outside the household ought to play a substan-
tial, albeit deferential, role as well.  The question remains, however,
how to divide authority between national and subnational govern-
ments over the necessary governmental role in supplying the deficits
of households.
II. FEDERALISM FOR FAMILIES: STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE
BETWEEN NATIONAL AND SUBNATIONAL POWER IN
EDUCATIONAL POLICY-MAKING
Using governmental policies to redress the educational shortcom-
ings of households does not eliminate collective action problems but
merely relocates them.  Instead of worrying about how households will
overcome failures of credit and insurance markets, one must worry
about overcoming failures of political mobilization.  Lobbying for
educational benefits has spillover benefits extending beyond the inter-
ests of any single individual or household: given that they can enjoy
the benefits of others’ political activity without contributing to it, why
would beleaguered household caregivers, juggling children’s home-
work, household chores, and employment, take time out of their
beleaguered schedules to participate in politics?  The usual problem
of political collective action is magnified when trying to raise public
funds to overcome failures of credit markets in education, because
most households, at any given moment, are childless.  Persuading or
outvoting these childless households is costly.  Winning against the
childless means hiring babysitters to attend boring hearings or PTA
meetings, informing oneself of rival politicians’ and bureaucrats’ edu-
cational proposals, organizing often acrimonious parent groups,
showing up at hearings, passing petitions, sending postcards and e-
36 See, e.g., Lawrence Rudner, Scholastic Achievement and Demographic Characteristics
of Home School Students in 1998, 7 EDUCATION POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES (1999), available
at http://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/article/view/543/666.
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mails to elected officials, and generally insuring that government pro-
vides the funds and rules necessary for effective education.  What
incentives do busy parents have to do their fair share and not free ride
off of their neighbors’ efforts?
As I suggest below in Part II.A, subnational government is that
collective-action facilitating device: households with children can
more easily overcome collective action problems where they do not
face the diseconomies of scale to which national government is subject.
There are several causes of such diseconomies, ranging from the
absence of capitalization of school quality into home values to the
higher relative costs of political participation for households with chil-
dren in jurisdictions larger than a school district.  This is not to say
that the federal government ought not to play a role in setting educa-
tional policy.  As I shall argue in Part II.B, there is an important but
constrained role for federal officials in redistributing wealth, funding
unemployment insurance, mandating certain educational programs
with national benefits, and supplying other national public goods.
But that role must be limited to avoid eliminating the institutional
advantages that stably governed households enjoy in subnational as
opposed to national democracy.
A. Three Advantages of Subnational Democracy For Mobilizing Support
for Education
Consider three advantages of subnational democracy in mobiliz-
ing support for education—bonding social capital, home-value capi-
talization, and ideological sorting.  Each of these advantages suggests
that subnational government ought to play a lead (although not an
exclusive) role in raising revenue for, and regulating the content of,
education.
1. Bonding Social Capital and Subnational Democracy
Increasing the size of a community tends to increase its demo-
graphic and ideological heterogeneity, and there are reasons to
believe that heterogeneity can impede cooperation by reducing what
Robert Putnam has termed “bonding social capital.”37  “Bonding
social capital” refers to the capacity of like-minded persons to cooper-
ate with each other in collective action tasks requiring high degrees of
trust and reciprocity.38  Putnam has defended the claim that social
37 ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE 19 (2000).
38 See id.  Credit for coining the term “social capital” goes not to Putnam but to
L.J. Hanifan, The Rural School Community Center, 67 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
130, 130 (1916), who argued that individuals could accumulate “social capital” just as
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heterogeneity decreases the capacity of citizens to cooperate, because
people who think alike will tend to trust each other more than people
who have ideological, religious, or cultural differences,39 a contention
that, despite being hotly controverted, has found support from other
researchers measuring the capacity of citizens to unite for civic
projects or interact with each other in political activities.40  Despite
the controversy that Putnam’s claim has generated, the claim that ide-
ological diversity impedes political cooperation is hardly novel, dating
at least from James Madison’s Federalist No. 10.
Regarding education in particular, there is some historical sup-
port for the claim that communities with lower levels of ethnocultural,
ideological, and income diversity have found it easier to raise revenue
for educational investments.  Claudia Goldin and Laurence Katz
found that school districts’ voters were more likely to embrace the
massive investment in high schools during the early twentieth century
if they were more economically and ethnoculturally homogenous.41
Likewise Marion Orr found that inter-racial distrust distracted Balti-
more schools from their educational mission.42
Households with children tend to have many opportunities for
social and political interaction, simply because children draw parents
into social networks of sports leagues, parent-teacher associations, and
more informal school activities.  As William Fischel notes, these net-
works can be used to participate in public life, as households with chil-
corporations could accumulate financial or physical capital.  According to Hanifan, if
an individual “may come into contact with his neighbor, and they with other neigh-
bors, there will be an accumulation of social capital, which may immediately satisfy his
social needs and which may bear a social potentiality sufficient to the substantial
improvement of living conditions in the whole community.” Id.
39 Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First
Century, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137, 142–43 (2007).
40 David Campbell has produced empirical evidence that ideological homogene-
ity within a community increases political participation motivated by a sense of civic
duty to a common social enterprise, while ideological heterogeneity increases partici-
pation motivated by a desire to prevail in a political conflict. See generally DAVID E.
CAMPBELL, WHY WE VOTE (2006) (detailing the study discussed above).  Campbell’s
study found that civic motivation was primarily affected by ideological rather than
demographic heterogeneity:  Boulder, Colorado counts on this score as more hetero-
geneous than Metro Detroit or Rochester, New York.  David E. Campbell, Community
Homogeneity and Participation, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association (Sept. 2–5, 2004) (transcript at 25–26).
41 See Claudia Goldin & Laurence F. Katz, The Origins of State-Level Differences in the
Public Provision of Higher Education: 1890–1940, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 303, 306 (1998);
Claudia Goldin & Laurence F. Katz, The Shaping of Higher Education: The Formative
Years in the United States, 1890 to 1940, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 37, 53 (1999).
42 MARION ORR, BLACK SOCIAL CAPITAL 40–41 (1999).
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dren come to know and trust each other as a result of their other
interactions in school-based networks.43  But Fischel also notes that
the social capital created by these networks is “community-specific”: it
is most effective within the local jurisdictions in which the network of
“social capitalists” is concentrated.44  Learning how to divide up time
and talking points with one’s neighbors helps a lot at the school
board’s microphone, because the neighbors are all physically concen-
trated within the jurisdiction of the school board.  Those skills will
not, however, help a lot with coordinating a campaign to influence a
congressional committee chair residing in another state.45
Elevating educational policymaking to the federal level, there-
fore, strips households with children of their most valuable political
asset—their social capital derived from their local networks.  As the
relevant constituency increases in size, those personal networks
become less politically useful: they are replaced by media that create
connections between strangers—mass mail alerts, email blasts, blog
posts, newsletters, television advertisements, etc.  Because these mass-
mobilizing devices cost money and require expertise in mass commu-
nication, groups with expertise in fundraising will have a comparative
advantage over households with children.  In effect, the change in
level of government also changes relative to political power, placing
households with children on turf where their skills and in-person net-
works are least relevant and where fundraising skills are most
relevant.46
By suggesting that households with children will do better subna-
tionally rather than nationally, I do not mean to suggest that smaller
jurisdictions are always “closer to the people.”  On issues where the
costs of acquiring information are very high, there might be scale
economies in communication that outweigh the advantages of cheap
access to local political networks.  For constituencies that are unaware
or uninterested in the relevant policies, the advantages of a large and
heterogeneous political ecology—a diverse national media with doz-
ens of websites, high levels of television coverage, nationally competi-
tive political parties, a plethora of competing interest groups, etc.—
may promote political participation far more effectively than the ease
of showing up at a hearing in person.  Because national political
43 See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, MAKING THE GRADE 238 (2009).
44 See id. at 227–29.
45 See id.
46 On the increasing importance of money in larger jurisdictions, see generally
Anthony Gierzynski & David Breaux, Legislative Elections and the Importance of Money, 21
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 337 (1996).  On the trade-off between cash and in-person networks,
see SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY 288, 303 (1994).
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processes tend to be more salient than subnational processes, the for-
mer might actually be “closer to the people” than the latter whenever
public consciousness of or interest in political issues is low.47
But the peculiar characteristic of stably governed households with
children is that their high stakes in educational policymaking already
tend to make them well-informed about educational policy disputes,
without the aid of a dense and heterogeneous interest group and
media environment.  The marginal gains in issue-salience from elevat-
ing educational issues to the national level will, therefore, likely be
small, while the loss of access to the relevant decision-makers is large.
If one accepts the argument in Part I that these households deserve
special deference on their educational decisions, then it also follows
that subnational politics ought to receive special primacy on educa-
tional policy-making, because subnational politics tend to give more
weight to the political strengths of stably governed households.
2. Capitalization and Subnational Democracy
Caregivers in charge of households with children are a minority
of voters.48  Political institutions that enable them to acquire allies
among the childless, therefore, are important for such households’
political success.  Tying the values of residential real estate to the qual-
ity of local schools is one way for these households to acquire such
allies.  Local school districts funded by ad valorem property taxes
imposed on structures within the district tie together home values and
school quality, giving childless homeowners an incentive to vote for
increased school spending.  School quality affects home values,
because potential homebuyers are well-informed about local govern-
ments’ policies to improve local school quality and shun markets that
lack amenities like schools.  To avoid driving away potential buyers
from the local market, local “home voters” carefully monitor local gov-
ernments’ decisions even when those voters do not directly consume
the services produced by local governments.  Thus, childless couples
are driven by capitalization of educational decisions into home values
47 On the tradeoff between political “access” (high at the subnational level) and
political “salience” (high at the national level but lower at the subnational levels), see
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Corruption and Federalism: (When) Do Federal Criminal Prosecutions
Improve Non-Federal Democracy?, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 113, 122 (2005).
48 See SCHOOL WISE PRESS, http://www.schoolwisepress.com/index.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 22, 2012).
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to care about the quality of local public schools even though they do
not care about the welfare of other people’s children.49
The key to capitalization, however, is decentralization of school
finance.  The benefits of improvements financed by extra tax effort
must be available only to those home buyers who purchase structures
to which that extra tax liability attaches.  If one could attend the
schools without buying the home, then only the cost of the tax effort,
not the benefit of the expenditures, would be capitalized into the
value of the homes, significantly eroding the incentive of those
homes’ owners to lobby for higher school taxes.
That capitalization can induce support for educational expendi-
tures in a decentralized system of school finance is suggested by the
rapid expansion of age-graded schools and high schools between 1870
and 1925.  This expansion represented a massive increase in school
expenditures—the second-largest in the nation’s history—because
high schools cost far more than one-room mixed-aged schoolhouses.50
As William Fischel has demonstrated, voters’ willingness to shoulder
these costs was rooted in the desire to protect their property values.
Far from being a “top-down” imposition by professional educators on
rural voters, the decision to consolidate school districts required local
referenda controlled by local voters who approved the consolidations
out of fear that their jurisdictions would be bypassed by home buyers
migrating to cities in search of better educational opportunity.51  The
need to cater to a mobile population also drove voters to adopt uni-
form curricular standards so that the children of new migrants arriv-
ing in September could pick up their schooling where they left off in
June.52  In effect, local action produced national curricular uniformity
and massive educational expenditures, driven by what Fischel calls
“the persuasion of property.”53
How willing would the childless be to pay for other people’s chil-
dren in the absence of capitalization?  There has been a fierce debate
over whether capitalization is necessary to induce voters to support
49 For an outline and defense of this capitalization-based theory of childless
households’ incentives to finance education, see WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOME
VOTER HYPOTHESIS 39–97 (2001).
50 See Fischel, supra note 44, at 68–72 (detailing the decline of one-room
schoolhouses).
51 See id. at 101–06; Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, Human Capital and Social
Capital: The Rise of Secondary Schooling in America, 1910–1940, 29 J. INTERDISCIPLINARY
HIST. 683, 683 (1999).
52 See FISCHEL, supra note 44, at 119–56.
53 See id. at 117–80.
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school spending.54  There is, however, significant evidence that capi-
talization can provide important motivation for elderly voters to cast
favorable votes for school spending.55  In light of the evidence of
generational competition in the allocation of public sector
resources,56 it seems reasonable not to test one’s luck with elderly vot-
ers’ altruism but instead to provide maximum incentives for the child-
less to support educational expenditures.  Decentralization of school
finance is one such incentive.
3. Ideological sorting and subnational government
Education policy is divisive, touching on ethnoculturally sensitive
issues of language and religion.  The ideological “heat” generated by
these issues can either paralyze the national political process in an
ethnoculturally heterogeneous nation or result in the marginalization
of cultural minorities.  Unsurprisingly, federal regimes with histories
of linguistic or religious conflict—Canada, Switzerland, and Ger-
many—devolve educational issues to subnational governments where
each demographic group constitutes a local majority.57  Such subna-
54 Much of this debate has revolved around whether centralization of school
finance in the wake of the California Supreme Court’s decision in Serrano v. Priest, 569
P.2d 1303 (Cal. 1977), induced voters to oppose state taxation sufficient to maintain
expenditures for California schools. Compare Kirk Stark & Jonathan Zasloff, Tiebout
and Tax Revolts: Did Serrano Really Cause Proposition 13?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 801 (2003)
(arguing that the Serano decision had little effect on Proposition 13), with William A.
Fischel, How Serrano Caused Proposition 13, 12 J.L. & POL. 607 (1996) (asserting Serano
did cause Proposition 13), and William A. Fischel, Did John Serrano Vote for Proposition
13? A Reply to Stark and Zasloff’s “Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did Serrano Really Cause
Proposition 13?”, 51 UCLA L. REV. 887 (2004) (claiming that Stark and Zasloff’s work
does not refute such an assertion).
55 See FISCHEL, supra note 44, at 49–51.
56 See generally James M. Poterba, Demographic Structure and the Political Economy of
Public Education, 16 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 48 (1997) (discussing the negative
relationship between school spending and voter age).  For a survey of evidence, see
James M. Poterba, Demographic Change, Intergenerational Linkages, and Public Education,
88 AM. ECON. REV. 315 (1998).
57 See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ FU¨R DIE BUNDESREBUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ]
[GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBL. I art. 7(4) (Ger.) (placing the regulation of
private schools under the regulation laws of the La¨nder [“unterstehen den
Landesgesetzen” ]); id. at art. 91a (defining the provision of higher education as a
“joint task” under which the federal legislature enacts through “framework legisla-
tion” or Rahmengesetze over which the La¨nder have control through the Bundesrat’s
veto); id. at art. 91b (defining the Federation-Land agreements for “educational plan-
ning and in the promotion of research institutions and research projects of suprare-
gional importance”); Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 93 (Eng.) (“In and
for each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Education
. . . .”).
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tional “sorting” of different groups’ favored policies in subnational
enclaves has the normative appeal of pluralism: by giving each group
some share of subnational power, ideological sorting satisfies a sense
of fair representation of each point of view that a single national reso-
lution of the divisive issue might offend.58
This normatively attractive vision of cultural pluralism helps
explain why education and family law were reserved for subnational
decision-making in the United States by the end of the 19th century.
There is a tendency in legal scholarship to implicitly disparage Ameri-
can localism on family matters as the product of racism and sexism.59
While this view has substantial historical justification, the explanation
ignores another basis for the nineteenth century ideology of localism
on family matters—cultural pluralism.  Within the Democratic Party, a
motley coalition of culturally peripheral groups joined the
Southerners in espousing a vision of cultural pluralism against what
they took to be a culturally imperialistic agenda of New England
evangelicals to impose moral uniformity on the nation.  This coalition
included not only Southern white supremacists but also back-
swoodsmen who wanted to hunt on Sunday, Catholics who wanted to
send their children to parochial school, Irish city dwellers who wanted
to socialize with their Tammany ward captain at the local saloon, and
German Lutherans who liked their beer.60  The “Yankee” evangelicals’
agenda against which this coalition fought certainly included anti-
patriarchal elements: Evangelicals relied heavily on the mobilization
of Christian mothers to purge the household of male violence and
male lack of personal self-control.61  But the program was also an
exceptionally intrusive and nativist effort to suppress cultural diversity
in the name of social control, an effort that included not only the
58 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism as Westphalian Liberalism, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 769, 788, 793 (2006).
59 As Jill Hasday has noted, rhetoric about family and educational matters being
“local affairs” has roots in Southerners’ opposition to Reconstruction. See Jill Elaine
Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1299 (1998).
Reva Siegel likewise attributes such rhetoric to the efforts of white Southerners to
sustain a culture of patriarchy in which male household heads could be dominant at
home, free from “external” intrusions of governmental officials. See Reva B. Siegel,
She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115
HARV. L. REV. 947, 1000–01 (2002).
60 For this ethnocultural explanation of nineteenth century political conflict, see
RONALD P. FORMISANO, THE BIRTH OF MASS POLITICAL PARTIES (1971); RICHARD J. JEN-
SEN, THE WINNING OF THE MIDWEST (1971); PAUL O. KLEPPNER, THE CROSS OF CULTURE
(1970).
61 On the gendered character of the Republican calls for moral reform, see
REBECCA EDWARDS, ANGELS IN THE MACHINERY (1997).
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goals of racial equality and women’s suffrage but also bans on paro-
chial education of children, use of foreign language in schools, polyg-
amous marriage, drinking of alcohol, smoking of tobacco, dueling,
gambling, and obscene literature while promoting Sabbath obser-
vance.62  Liberation of the freedmen from Southern oppression was
part of a larger agenda for liberating all non-protestant minorities
from the oppression and social isolation allegedly resulting from Cath-
olic superstition, the German language, gambling, alcohol, and other
sins against family values and national Protestant unity.63
The various cultural minorities resisting this evangelical program
could not be united by any substantive theory of the household or
privacy: white Southerners had no love for Catholic parochial schools,
and German Lutherans in the Midwest were relatively indifferent to
Jim Crow.  Instead, the Democratic Party held the coalition together
with the rhetoric of decentralizing “domestic matters” in the name of
cultural pluralism.64  Regarding education in particular, this Demo-
cratic program of decentralization of family matters began in earnest
as early as 1842, when Northern Democrats had used the rhetoric of
“local control” in educational matters to pass the 1842 Maclay Act in
New York.65  Decentralization became the standard Democratic
method of accommodating Catholic demands for power over schools,
enabling them to satisfy Catholics’ desire to control hiring and curric-
ulum where they were numerically dominant while avoiding the accu-
sation that Democrats favored “papist” schools.66  Appealing to this
anti-Yankee coalition, the Democratic Party used this slogan of local
control over “domestic affairs” to defeat Republican efforts to pro-
62 On the moral agenda of the evangelical wing of the Republican Party, see
FORMISANO, supra note 61, at 328.  On the idea of a “benevolent empire” of interde-
nominational Protestant reformers, see RONALD G. WALTERS, AMERICAN REFORMERS
1815–1860, p.p. 33–34 (2d ed. 1997).
63 See WARD M. MCAFEE, RELIGION, RACE, AND RECONSTRUCTION 20–24 (1998).
64 See id.
65 In a bid for Catholic support, Governor Seward of New York, a Whig, offered
to replace New York City’s system of private schools run by a charitable society with a
system of ward-based public schools to be governed by a board elected by voters
within the ward.  Seward, however, could not bring his Whigs along to endorse his
proposed decentralization measure. See DIANE RAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS,
NEW YORK CITY, 1805–1973, p.p. 67–69 (1974).  In response, Democrats led by Wil-
liam Maclay, the state assemblyman who chaired the Schools Committee, then took
up the cause of New York City’s Catholics, urging ward control over local educational
policy in the name of the Democrat’s anti-monopoly ideology. Id. at 70–71.  Despite
deep misgivings from Democrats and opposition from Whigs, the Maclay Act passed
after being amended to ban “sectarian” instruction in school. Id. at 72–76.
66 See BENJAMIN JUSTICE, THE WAR THAT WASN’T 69–87, 103–05 (2005); CARL F.
KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC 154 (1983).
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mote racial equality in schools, defeating federal bills providing finan-
cial aid for schools between 1870 and 187267 and stripping Charles
Sumner’s Civil Rights bill of its provisions barring segregation in edu-
cation in 1874.68  The Southerners returned the Northern Catholics’
support on race issues in 1875 by helping the Catholics defeat Repub-
licans’ proposed constitutional amendments that would have barred
public aid to religious schools or societies.69  Uniting the Democrats
was not (merely) white supremacy but hostility to what was perceived
as the Yankees’ “aggressive didacticism” in family affairs.70  As one
Democratic opponent of the Blaine amendment declaimed, his state
did not want “New England and other states to dictate to her what her
schools shall be or what her taxes shall be, and least of all what her
religion shall be.”71  Southern Protestants might not have loved
Catholics, but both hated the “Yankee” reformer even more than they
disliked each other.
Republicans’ program of federal regulation of schools for the
sake of racial, religious, and linguistic integration turned out to be a
consistent political loser, destroying the Republican Party in the
South,72 alienating German Lutherans in the Midwest,73 and galvaniz-
67 See MCAFEE, supra note 64, at 105–15.
68 Id. at 153–57.
69 President Grant proposed an amendment in his annual message to Congress
on December 7, 1875, “prohibiting the granting of any school funds or taxes, or any
part thereof, either by the legislative, municipal, or other authority, for the benefit or
in aid, directly or indirectly, of any religious sect or denomination, or in aid or for the
benefit of any other object of any nature or kind whatever.”  Steven K. Green, The
Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38, 52 (1992).  Blaine’s amend-
ment re-worded Grant’s proposal to provide that “no money raised by taxation in any
State for the support of public schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor
any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect,
nor shall any money so raised or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects
or denominations.”  4 CONG. REC. 205 (1875).  Although the proposed amendment
passed the House, it was narrowly defeated in the Senate after the failure of several
efforts to strengthen its perhaps deliberately ambiguous language.  Because the
amendment passed by the House barred only the use of money “raised by taxation . . .
for the support of public schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, or any
public lands devoted thereto,” the question was left open whether it applied to gen-
eral revenues raised for general purposes.  Efforts to close the loophole floundered in
the Senate. See 4 CONG. REC. 5245–46 (1876).
70 DANIEL WALKER HOWE, THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE AMERICAN WHIGS 33
(1979).
71 4 CONG. REC. 5589 (1876) (statement by Senator Stevenson).
72 Republican support for Sumner’s proposal to racially desegregate schools led
to the devastation of the Republican Party in the South and Midwest in the 1874
elections, causing the Republicans to lose control of the House of Representatives.
See RICHARD H. ABBOTT, THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND THE SOUTH, 1855–1877, p.p.
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ing Catholics everywhere to become passionately loyal Democratic vot-
ers.  By the 1890s, Republican strategists had had enough: William
McKinley assiduously avoided any discussion of culturally divisive
racial, ethnic, or religious issues in his 1896 Presidential campaign.74
Republicans and Democrats alike accepted the principle so thor-
oughly that, by 1904, Justice Holmes, a Civil War veteran and national-
ist, could, in dissenting from the majority’s broad reading of
congressional powers in Northern Securities v. United States,75 invoke the
prospect of “Congress[’s] . . . regulat[ing] . . . marriage and divorce”
as the ultimate constitutional absurdum that commerce clause doc-
trine ought to avoid.76
In sum, there was more to the nineteenth century rhetoric of
local control over family affairs than white supremacy or patriarchy
(although both prejudices motivated Catholics and Southerners
deploying such rhetoric).  As with other culturally heterogeneous fed-
eral regimes, the United States also adopted devolution of family mat-
ters in the late nineteenth century as a way of fostering cultural
pluralism on issues that were culturally and religiously sensitive to
ethnocultural minorities.
The normative appeal of such subnational “ideological sorting”
obviously depends on the ideologies being sorted.  If the disputed
question is the basic status of a group of persons as equal citizens,
230–31 (1986); WILLIAM GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION, 1869–1879, p.p.
198–258 (1979); MICHAEL PERMAN, THE ROAD TO REDEMPTION 140–41 (1984).  South-
ern Republicans generally opposed desegregation, fearing correctly that it would
destroy their support among poor whites who might otherwise go along with a policy
of “separate but equal.”  Howard N. Rabinowitz, From Exclusion to Segregation: Southern
Race Relations, 1865–1890, 63 J. AM. HIST. 325, 332–33 (1976).  Some of these “carpet-
bagger” Republicans, such as Albion Tourgee, the North Carolina state court judge
and novelist, passionately supported equality for the freedmen at risk of their lives but
nevertheless bitterly excoriated Charles Sumner for pressing the school desegregation
issue without regard to electoral realities in the South. See OTTO H. OLSEN, CARPET-
BAGGER’S CRUSADE 203 (1965).
73 See JENSEN, supra note 61, at 147 (describing the politics of Midwestern Demo-
crats in appealing to German and Scandinavian Lutherans to resist Republican
reformers’ efforts to require the teaching of English as a predominant language in all
schools during the late 1880s).
74 See OLSEN, supra note 73, at 332–35.
75 193 U.S. 197 (2004).
76 Id. at 402–03 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Commerce depends upon population,
but Congress could not, on that ground, undertake to regulate marriage and divorce.
If the act before us is to be carried out according to what seems to me the logic of the
argument for the Government, which I do not believe that it will be, I can see no part
of the conduct of life with which on similar principles Congress might not
interfere.”).
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then devolution will not likely be regarded as a morally justified settle-
ment: the jurisdictional divisions of subnational borders will not stop
citizens in one jurisdiction from sympathizing with the sufferings of
minorities in other regions, and their outrage will likely overwhelm
any legalistic limits on national power.77  Few would applaud federal-
ism for the sake of safeguarding pluralism about Jim Crow.  Over
some range of issues, however, difference of opinion does not impli-
cate the essential equality of citizens: the Democratic Party’s policy of
devolving authority to subnational jurisdictions over the regulation of
alcoholic beverages and aid to parochial schools, for instance, did not
lead to an acrimonious culture war, and it extended equal concern
and respect to both sides of the cultural divide.  Education and family
law present many similar issues—i.e., matters that are religiously or
culturally sensitive enough for devolution to advance pluralism but
sufficiently remote from oppression as to present small risk of affront
to democratic equality.78  It is natural, then, to preserve subnational
jurisdiction over family life as a general matter, while making excep-
tions for national intervention when subnational jurisdictions behave
oppressively towards vulnerable groups—in effect, keeping the baby
without the bathwater.
B. When Should There Be a Federal Role in Education?  Supplying
National Public Goods and Removing Barriers to Subnational
Political Participation
Given the efficacy of subnational government in supplying educa-
tion subnationally, what role should the federal government play?
Conventional federalism theory suggests two national functions—sup-
plying national public goods and removing barriers to subnational
political participation.  As I shall suggest in Part II, the former is much
easier for the national government to accomplish than the latter.
77 As Abraham Lincoln noted, slavery constituted such an issue, because subna-
tional resolution in favor of slavery in one region would inevitably spark intense moral
revulsion in other regions, prodding the latter to stretch their legal powers to discour-
age the evil rather than to remain neutral. See Abraham Lincoln, Speech at New
Haven Connecticut (Mar. 6, 1860), in 4 COLLECTED WORKS OF LINCOLN 13, 18 (Roy P.
Basler ed., 1953).  “[W]e cannot help dealing with it: we must do something about it,
whether we will or not. . . . We think that a respect for ourselves, a regard for future
generations and for the God that made us, require that we put down this wrong where
our votes will properly reach it.” Id. at 15–16.
78 Consider, for instance, bilingual education, vouchers for religious schools, sex-
ual education, civics curriculum, disciplinary policy, traditional or novel pedagogy,
etc., none of which present serious risk that any group will be subordinated with Jim
Crow-style oppression.
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1. Supplying National Public Goods
That the national government has a role to play in supplying
national public educational goods has been recognized at least since
the federal government created the United States Military Academy at
West Point in 1802.  A national public good is simply a good the bene-
fits of which transcend subnational boundaries such that no single
unit of subnational government—a household, township, municipal-
ity, county, or state—has sufficient incentive to produce the benefit in
sufficient quantity.79  Military technology like engineering is an obvi-
ous example: fearful that the nation would be dependent on foreign
engineers for its military needs, Jefferson created the West Point Acad-
emy despite his general philosophy of limiting federal power.  The
private market for engineering services would not likely motivate par-
ents or school districts to finance human capital in the arcana of civil
engineering in sufficient quantity to supply the army’s military need,
simply because those needs reflect the non-excludable benefits of
domestic defense that no private market actor can capture.  It is easy
enough mutatis mutandis to justify many other national educational
programs that subsidize national public goods under-supplied by sub-
national government.  Whenever the benefits of an educational pro-
gram exceed the boundaries of a state, there is a theoretical case for a
federal grant program to encourage state production of the program.
The boundary-crossing benefits of a program are not merely the
result of the program’s inherent characteristics but also the constitu-
tional ground rules that prohibit state interference with the move-
ment of goods and persons across state lines.  Take, for example,
unemployment insurance and aid to indigent households more gener-
ally.  Because states are prohibited from excluding or taxing goods
manufactured in other states, states cannot easily charge their own
manufacturers with the costs of unemployment insurance for fear that
those businesses will be put out of business by non-resident firms con-
stitutionally immune from such charges but nevertheless importing
cheap goods into the state.  Fear of such competition from Southern
states deterred Northern states from offering unemployment insur-
ance programs despite then-Governor Franklin Roosevelt’s efforts to
organize cooperative action among the states.80  Precisely such worries
about the interstate mobility of capital led the U.S. Supreme Court to
uphold the Social Security Act’s unemployment insurance program in
79 See Public Goods, in Glossary, THE WORLD BANK GROUP, http://worldbank.org/
depweb/english/beyond/global/glossary.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2012) (defining
“national public good” as “benefiting the entire population of a country”).
80 See PETERSON, supra note 3, at 96–97.
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Steward Machine Co. v. Davis.81 Thus, subsidies for unemployment
insurance are a national public good, because the benefits of income
smoothing transcend the boundaries of any single state.
Likewise, redistribution of wealth to insure a national minimum
of income for U.S. citizens constitutes a national public good,
because, given the constitutionally guaranteed mobility of indigent cit-
izens,82 any single state’s efforts to supply such a national minimum
will encourage other states to export their indigent households to the
generous state.83  Subsidizing education is an especially attractive
mechanism for redistributing income, because educational subsidies
avoid the perception of moral hazard that dampens well-heeled citi-
zens’ willingness to part with their own cash to insure a national wel-
fare minimum.  Federal aid for free school lunch, Head Start pre-
kindergarten childcare, and aid under the ESEA program are all
examples of such federal aid for indigent households, justified by the
national scope of redistributive programs’ benefits, a scope insured by
interstate mobility of indigency.
These familiar general points regarding redistribution of wealth
apply with special force to education: subnational governments are
notoriously unreliable agents of indigent households when providing
educational services, because the usual devices that induce constitu-
ents to lobby for educational improvement—capitalization of schools
into home values and school-based social networks of child-rearing
households—fail where indigent households are concerned.  Capitali-
zation fails, because attracting indigent homebuyers generally does
not improve “homevoters’” home values.84  School-based networks fail
whenever indigency erodes the bonding social capital that allows
other households to dominate the educational process.  It is a familiar
point that such social capital is closely related to educational attain-
ment and reduced by crime.  Single parents are also much less capa-
ble of networking to advance their children’s interests.  Given that
crime, single parenthood, and lack of a high school diploma are
81 301 U.S. 548, 588 (1937).
82 See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941).
83 See PETERSON, supra note 3, at 27.
84 Because indigent households purchase or rent cheaper structures than the
average structure in a jurisdiction, they pay a lower-than-average property tax bill.
Such a cross-subsidy lowers rather than raises home values of the neighbors who pay
the cross-subsidy, inducing those neighbors to deter the immigration of indigent
households through devices such as restrictive zoning that forces newcomers to live in
structures with values comparable to those of current residents.   On the general con-
cept of “fiscal zoning,” see David E. Hamilton, Building the Associative State: The Depart-
ment of Agriculture and American State-Building, 64 AGRIC. HIST. 207 (1990).
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closely correlated with indigency, it is no surprise that indigent house-
holds do not make superlative monitors of their educational
providers.
That the federal government would intervene to supplement and
control educational services in jurisdictions containing a high per-
centage of indigent households, therefore, would seem to follow natu-
rally from the logic of educational federalism.  This is analogous to
the logic described in Part I.B above that leads the subnational gov-
ernment to intervene when the internal governance of the household
itself collapses as a result of poverty, low educational attainment,
divorce, etc.  Just as such households are not such reliable providers of
childcare that the state can easily defer to their judgments about edu-
cation, so too, jurisdictions dominated by such households are
unlikely to be reliable providers of educational services.
2. Democratization of Subnational Governments
The national government also has a role to play in democratizing
subnational governments, because the reliability of subnational gov-
ernments depends entirely on their responsiveness to popular
demand.  This is true both broadly as a matter of popular sovereignty,
constitutionally (as a matter of Article IV, section 4), and narrowly as a
matter of using federalism to advance children’s welfare.  Oligarchical
governments—for instance, Alabama’s government between 1901 and
1946, when it was dominated by the “Big Mules” of local industry and
the timberland owners—may tend to under-supply local public goods
to protect their interests from taxation.85  Likewise, deep ethnocul-
tural hostilities may lead a majority coalition to freeze out a minority,
consequently undersupplying local public goods to that minority
because of its lack of political power.
There is a familiar justification for the national government to
play in ending such minority cartels over subnational government:
because the national government will be controlled by a different and
more heterogeneous coalition of interests than any single state, the
oligarchical state’s dominant group will not be able, in theory, to
stymie national legislation democratizing that state’s political process.
85 CARL GRAFTON & ANNE PERMALOFF, BIG MULES AND BRANCHHEADS 39–59
(1985).  In theory, even an oligarch will want to maximize the re-sale value of their
real estate and, therefore, will have an incentive to supply local public goods to attract
homebuyers.  In practice, such an attitude requires an active interstate market in
housing and liquid real estate interests that can be converted into residential real
estate in response to such demand.  Both ingredients may have been missing in pre-
WWII Alabama.
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Likewise, there may be certain economies of scale in political partici-
pation: national politics have more developed media, more competi-
tive political parties, and more visible political figures.  These scale
economies may allow national leaders to highlight and eliminate polit-
ical abuses at the subnational level that could pass unspotted if left to
the exclusive attention of subnational officials.
There are numerous familiar and less obvious examples of the
federal government’s playing such a democratizing role in subna-
tional government.  The obvious examples include the Guarantee
Clause of Article IV of the U.S. Constitution,86 the Fifteenth, Nine-
teenth, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-sixth Amendments, and the Voting
Rights Act87 and the Motor Voter Act.88  The less obvious examples
include federal prosecutions of subnational officials’ corrupt actions
under federal statutes like the Mail Fraud Act89 and the Hobbs Act,90
prosecutions best justified by the low salience of much subnational
politics and consequent need for an outside authority to highlight vio-
lations of the subnational jurisdiction’s own ethical standards.91  The
federal role in desegregating schools and insuring equal access to edu-
cation for racial minorities is the obvious education-specific example
of such democratization.  From Brown v. Board of Education92 to Title
VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,93 the federal government’s major role
in education has been in insuring an end to racial isolation, segrega-
tion, and denial of equal educational opportunity, justified implicitly
by the subnational governments’ lack of trustworthiness in pursuing
these goals.
III. OVERCOMING DISECONOMIES OF SCALE IN FEDERAL
EDUCATIONAL REFORM
There is no doubt that, both as a matter of law and political the-
ory, the federal government appropriately plays some sort of role in
educational policy.  As explained below in Part III.A, however, scale
diseconomies threaten to stymie federal policy’s effectiveness.  The
size and heterogeneity of congressional districts make it difficult for
86 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
87 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973aa-6 (2006).
88 Id. §§ 1973gg–1973gg-10 (2006).
89 Mail Fraud Act, ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1123 (1909) (as codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1341–42 (2006)).
90 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006).
91 See Hills, supra note 48.
92 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
93 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (1964) (as codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d–2000d-4a (2006)).
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stably governed households to use their school-based networks to
lobby for adequate school revenue in Congress.  Federal investments
in education, financed from nationally uniform taxes, are not capital-
ized into home values, depriving the federal government of the power
to mobilize childless households on behalf of educational invest-
ments.  Stripped of these special advantages of capitalization and
social capital, the federal government’s policies can also be paralyzed
by ideological polarization in Congress resulting from a culturally het-
erogeneous nation, polarization that is mitigated by ideological sort-
ing at the subnational level.  All of these diseconomies become
exacerbated when the beneficiaries of the federal program already
lack the social networks used by stably governed households to moni-
tor educational providers.  For such beneficiaries, misuse of federal
funds is invisible: they are poor enforcers of federal mandates through
either politics or litigation.
As I shall suggest below in Part III.B, the precondition for effec-
tive federal assistance is the creation of a “political machine”—a local
network of politically active recipients of federal dollars—that can be
trusted to advance federal goals by getting federal dollars to the right
people for the right purpose.  Such a network duplicates the subna-
tional governments’ advantages by creating some of the networks of
program advocates that the federal government otherwise lacks.  I will
conclude with some observations about how the federal government
might duplicate that track record when aiding low-income
households.
A. How Scale Diseconomies Misdirect Federal Dollars: Title I’s and Head
Start’s Rocky Track Records
The history of federal involvement in educational aid to indigent
households is a history of federal scale diseconomies rendering inef-
fective the federal assistance.  The essential difficulty is that assistance
was directed to service providers, the incentives of which were imper-
fectly aligned with federal goals.  In effect, the federal government
had chosen an unreliable “machine” to subsidize.  If the beneficiaries
of the money were politically well-organized or had well-organized
allies, then they could have come to the assistance of the federal gov-
ernment (and themselves).  But indigent households lack the social
capital of stably governed households, and the latter, far from wanting
to assist the former in securing federal money, sought to appropriate
that money for themselves.  Moreover, the heterogeneity of the
national population interfered with the federal government’s capacity
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to seek out more reliable allies: sectional controversy deterred federal
use of religious education providers.
The problems with misappropriation of federal aid began soon
after Title I of the Elementary & Secondary Education Act (ESEA)94
was enacted in 1965.  The ESEA provided up to $3 billion of aid (by
1970) to aid “local education agencies serving areas with concentra-
tions of children from low-income families.”95  Within four years, how-
ever, a reputable study found that the money given to school districts
was not actually spent on the education of low-income children.96
Moreover, the Martin-McClure study found that subnational govern-
ments made no effort to evaluate whether Title I money was being
spent on classroom instruction that had any likelihood of improving
socially disadvantaged students’ education.97  This finding was
repeated by later studies showing that school districts systematically
spent more on middle-income children than children from low-
income households, largely because teacher salaries vary lockstep with
seniority and the education of the teacher, insuring that dollars are
not targeted to the teachers serving the neediest students.98  Aside
from not being well-targeted towards low-income students, Title I and
Head Start expenditures have consistently under-performed in pro-
ducing educational results.  Since the publication of A Nation at Risk,
the federal government has increasingly demanded that recipients of
federal aid for compensatory education test their students to show
improvements in their learning.99  Despite almost thirty decades of
increasingly strict accountability measures, however, the results have
been disappointing.100
94 Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (as codified in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C (2006)).
95 Id. § 201.
96 RUBY MARTIN & PHYLLIS MCCLURE, TITLE I OF ESEA: IS IT HELPING POOR CHIL-
DREN? (1969).
97 See Jerome T. Murphy, Title I of ESEA: The Politics of Implementing Federal Educa-
tion Reform, 41 HARV. EDUC. REV. 35, 55 (1971) (citing the Martin-McClure study as
finding “inadequate time and attendance records, lack of substantiation of overtime
pay to [Title I] teachers, inadequate accounting procedures covering contractual ser-
vices, inadequate equipment controls, and unremitted unused funds”).
98 See generally MARGUERITE ROZA, EDUCATIONAL ECONOMICS (2010) (showing that
teacher salaries bear no correlation to educational need of students).
99 See generally MARIS A. VINOVSKIS, FROM A NATION AT RISK TO NO CHILD LEFT
BEHIND (2009) (chronicling the increasingly strict accountability standards imposed
by federal law).
100 For a report card on student progress in at the end of the 1990s, see Maris A.
Vinovskis, Do Federal Compensatory Education Programs Really Work? A Brief Historical
Analysis of Title I and Head Start, 107 AM. J. EDUC. 187 (1999).  For a more recent
assessment, see DAVID K. COHEN & SUSAN L. MOFFITT, THE ORDEAL OF EQUALITY
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The cause of the subnational misdirection of ESEA money was
not subnational fraud but rather the usual difficulty with intergovern-
mental aid: all money being green, school districts could offset the
federal aid they received by re-directing state and local funds to serve
noisier constituencies—middle-class parents in the suburbs and teach-
ers in search of salary bumps unrelated to the teaching of low-income
students.  This pattern of subnational governments’ redirecting fed-
eral grants from assisting low-income households to local goals is not
confined to educational grants: subnational agents ordinarily pursue
local goals (for instance, economic development) with national
resources unless carefully monitored by their national principal.101
Indeed, these local incentives to under-provide national goods are
precisely the justification for the federal grant in the first place.102
The federal government has attempted to solve this problem of
unfaithful subnational implementation by tightening national stan-
dards of curriculum and student evaluation.  But the federal govern-
ment itself is impeded by scale diseconomies that prevent it from
controlling errant subnational behavior.  The federal government
lacks the fiscal tools available to subnational governments—in particu-
lar, capitalization of educational investments into property values—
that could induce local voters to pay less attention to the fate of grant
revenues than own-source revenues.  That local voters focus less
intensely on the fate of grant revenues than own-source revenues is a
familiar point.103  By contrast with the parents and taxpayers of a
school district, voters at the national scale pay little attention to fed-
eral reform efforts.104  Moreover, the federal governments’ threats to
(2009); VINOVSKIS, supra note 99, at 220–22.  On the failure of subnational govern-
ments to allocate money on the basis of any research-based theory of cost-effective-
ness, see Allan Odden & Lawrence O. Picus, School Finance Adequacy at a Crossroads, 32
EDUC. WEEK 40 (2007).
101 PAUL E. PETERSON ET AL., WHEN FEDERALISM WORKS 171–72 (1986).
102 See id. at 170–74; Helen Ingram, Policy Implementation Through Bargaining: The
Case of Federal Grants, 25 PUB. POL’Y 499, 513–19 (1977); Donald B. Rosenthal, Bargain-
ing Analysis in Intergovernmental Relations, 10 PUBLIUS 5, 26–28 (1980) (describing local
governments’ officials dickering with federal officials over vague terms in federal stat-
ute to secure greater power to use federal grants for local ends).
103 That voters monitor grant revenue less carefully than own-source revenue gen-
erated from local taxes is suggested by the so-called “flypaper” effect, under which
bureaucrats have more control over grant revenue than own-source revenue. See gen-
erally James R. Hines, Jr. & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Flypaper Effect, 9 J. ECON.
PERSP. 217 (1995) (explaining the anomalies of the “flypaper effect”).
104 For an account of widespread voter ignorance about federal promises and per-
formance in education, see PETER D. HART RESEARCH ASSOCS. & WINSTON GRP., STAN-
DARDS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND FLEXIBILITY (2007), http://www.ets.org/Media/
Education_Topics/pdf/5884_Key_Findings.pdf.
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discipline the local school district for sluggish response to federal
mandates are impeded by the small amounts of federal revenue at
stake: threats to pull grants can be empty threats when the realization
of the threat would injure the very constituencies that the feds are
trying to aid.105  Parental social networks that might work at the local
level are less effective at the national level.  Ideological gridlock is
most intense at the national level, and such strife has impeded the
federal government’s ability to impose accountability measures.  The
re-authorization of “No Child Left Behind” has languished in legisla-
tive limbo since 2007 as Congress is paralyzed by partisan gridlock,
and ethnocultural conflict has prevented the federal government
from using private educational providers to induce greater fidelity
from local school districts.106
The problem in monitoring federal compensatory education is
obviously not exclusively the result of federal scale diseconomies: the
whole point of federal intervention, as noted in Part I.B.2, is to rem-
edy subnational unresponsiveness to the educational need of low-
income households that existed long before the federal government
tried to remedy this inattention.  Low-income parents might be
expected to pay less attention to educational politics than more stably
governed households because they lack education, confidence, time,
and energy, as noted in Part I.A.  The important point is that the fed-
eral government cannot solve the problem of subnational indiffer-
ence to merely imposing federal mandates of curricular standards,
testing mandates, and the like.  Ordering the tide of student igno-
rance to recede with a statutory edict declaring high national stan-
dards and ordering recalcitrant educators to comply has Canute-like
futility to it.  Without some local mechanism to exact compliance,
such orders remain empty rhetoric.
105 See MICHAEL J. RICH, FEDERAL POLICYMAKING AND THE POOR 233–34 (1993).
The threats by various states and school districts to turn down federal money rather
than accept federal testing mandates and the Obama Administration’s recent waiver
of NCLB requirements for states that accept yet further accountability measures sug-
gest that federal revenue lacks the coercive effect sometimes attributed to it. See Sam
Dillon, Facing State Protests, U.S. Offers More Flexibility on School Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8,
2005, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/08/education/08child.
html; Winnie Hu, 10 States Are Given Waivers from Education Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,
2012, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/education/10-states-
given-waivers-from-no-child-left-behind-law.html.
106 No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006).  From the outset of Title I,
controversy over aid to religious schools has prevented Congress from providing any
voucher option to supplement federal aid for “compensatory education” even for pal-
pably inadequate public schools.
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B. The Importance of Household-Based Networks to Successful Federal
Educational Policy
The federal government needs to re-create the sort of institutions
for low-income households that enable stably governed households to
overcome their collective action problems at the subnational level.
Instead of trying to figure out the most technically perfect form of
school through research-based mandates, the federal government
needs some “boots on the ground” with an interest in low-income chil-
dren’s educational success.  In short, the federal government needs a
reliable “machine.”
The importance of having well-organized networks of program
beneficiaries to police federal mandates is suggested by those federal
educational mandates that have been successfully enforced.  The fed-
eral government’s first foray into educational policy involved setting
aside sections of Western land for the support of schools.107  As Wil-
liam Fischel has noted, this policy was driven by a desire to make West-
ern land marketable to pioneering households migrating westwards in
search of family-friendly real estate.108  Landowners bidding on fed-
eral lots and territorial officials had a large incentive to comply with
the federal command, because it was enforced not only by national
officials’ action but by western migrants’ purchases.  Likewise, the sys-
tem of agricultural extension education, in which federally financed
agents would travel to farms, propagating modern farming technology
in the county where the farmers resided, was successful, because the
Department of Agriculture cultivated county-based networks of farm-
ers organized into local Farmers’ Bureaus.109  Those Bureaus effec-
tively controlled the extension agents, advancing the federal agenda
because they had incentives properly aligned with the federal govern-
ment’s program of farming modernization.110
Could the federal government foster similar networks to enforce
federal mandates for low-income students’ academic achievement?
The example of agricultural extension is encouraging insofar as farm-
ers were relatively disorganized at the national level until the Depart-
ment of Agriculture stepped in to organize them into Farmers’
Bureaus, creating a national network of program advocates that did
107 See FISCHEL, supra note 44, at 21.
108 Id.
109 Hamilton, supra note 84, at 214–15.
110 See GRANT MCCONNELL, THE DECLINE OF AGRARIAN DEMOCRACY 171–76 (1953)
(describing the power of Farmers’ Bureaus over extension agents); Hamilton, supra
note 85, at 214–15.
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not previously exist.111  But the analogy is discouraging in that family
farms already possessed the bonding social capital of a stably governed
household that the federal government merely had to redirect into a
national network of federally fostered connections forming a powerful
national lobby.  By contrast, low-income households do not tend to be
stably governed households and would need a boost in self-
organization.
It is beyond the scope of this article to lay out a theory of parental
empowerment.  Instead, I note only that inattention to the political
organizations necessary to sustain both the techniques and outcomes
are a recipe for a kind of policy-making Attention Deficit Disorder—
in Charles Payne’s telling phrase, “so much reform, so little
change”112—in which politicians raise unrealistic expectations that
some educational program will yield test-score improvements in the
short-term.  In designing a system of federal aid for compensatory
education, therefore, the federal government ought to pay some
attention to sustaining the parental networks necessary to sustain a
program.
How might such attention affect the character of federal reforms?
First, a focus on fostering the parental networks capable of sustaining
reforms might lead to a greater emphasis on parental satisfaction and
involvement in the schools as criteria for educational success.  Some
types of schools—notably, private schools funded with vouchers given
to the parents—seem consistently to generate much higher levels of
parental satisfaction than others.113  Should these levels of satisfaction
count in the same way that test scores count—as criteria for a success-
ful school?  Should the level of parental willingness to involve them-
selves in school, by attending a PTA meeting or meeting with teachers,
count?  If one were interested in fostering parental networks, then
one might argue that such indicia of interest and involvement ought
to be relevant to the continuing flow of federal aid.  The criteria for
the Obama Administration’s “Race to the Top” (“RT3”) program,
awarding aid to subnational jurisdictions under the America Recovery
and Reinvestment Act,114 makes subnational governments’ fostering
of parental interest in education a minor criterion for awards.115  But
111 See DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY 316–20
(2001); MCCONNELL, supra note 111, at 171–76.
112 PAYNE, supra note 4.
113 See WILLIAM G. HOWELL ET AL., THE EDUCATION GAP 168–84 (rev. ed. 2006).
114 Pub. L. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
115 States can win up to ten points (out of 125 points for “state success factors”) by
using “support from a broad group of stakeholders to better implement its plans, as
evidenced by the strength of statements or actions of support from . . . (b) parents,
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none of the criteria for fostering “Great Teachers and Leaders”
include any evaluation of teachers and principals for their success in
getting parents to show an interest in the school through volunteer
activity, showing up at meetings, or otherwise.116  If one wanted the
RT3 program to be sustained beyond the current Administration, then
taking into account the robustness of parental networks involved with
the school might be worth a few more points.  Second, there is some
evidence that schools can be a site for generalized social capital, either
by drawing together parents whose children live in the school’s
attendance zone117 or by forming a focus for local entrepreneurs who
involve themselves with community affairs ranging from litter cleanup
to crime watches.118  The extent to which a subnational jurisdiction
can encourage such entrepreneurship might, again, be a criterion
worth considering in assessing a subnational jurisdiction’s educational
success.
Third and most important, the federal government should be
wary of trying to re-make subnational education from the ground up.
There have been various proposals over the last half-century for com-
prehensive federal reform of subnational education—for instance,
replacing subnational systems of taxation with nationally supervised
systems of finance119 or imposing curricular standards and standard-
ized tests aligned with those standards on stably governed households
as well as low-income households.120  But there is no reason to believe
that the federal government enjoys any comparative advantage in
managing education as a general matter.  In discrete educational
areas where stably governed households are not dominant or where
their incentives are misaligned with the national interest, there is a
case for a federal presence.  Given that information is the paradig-
matic national public good, there is a strong case for a federal role in
students, and community organizations.” See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP
PROGRAM: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7 (2009), http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothe
top/executive-summary.pdf.
116 Id. at 9–10.
117 See FISCHEL, supra note 44.
118 See generally Margaret F. Brinig & Nicole Stelle Garnett, Catholic Schools, Charter
Schools, and Urban Neighborhoods, 122 YALE L. J. (forthcoming 2012) (discussing the
negative effects of Catholic school closures).
119 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972) represents
the U.S. Supreme Court’s rejection of such an effort, often criticized for preserving
subnational financial inequity.
120 For an account of New York protests from a decade ago against standardized
testing, see Anemona Hartocollis, Boycotts and a Bill Protest Mandatory State Tests, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2002, at B9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/06/us/boy-
cotts-and-a-bill-protest-mandatory-state-tests.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
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promulgating information about subnational school systems’ inputs
and outputs.  There is also a powerful case for federal educational
empowerment of low-income households that are not stably governed.
Neither of these national functions, however, requires the wholesale
federalization of curriculum, evaluation of teachers or students, or
management and finance of schools.121
121 For a reform proposal that limits federal involvement in K-12 education to
promulgating information and directly financing low-income households’ education
in public and private schools, see HOOVER INST. KORET TASK FORCE ON K–12 EDUC.,
CHOICE AND FEDERALISM (2012), http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/Choice-and-Federalism.pdf.
